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Introduction 
 
 
The West’s Darling in Syria 
Seeking Support, the Kurdish Democratic Union Party Brandishes an Anti-Jihadist Image 
Khaled Yacoub Oweis 
US bombings in 2015 repulsed Islamic State attacks on cities in mostly Kurdish self-
rule regions called cantons in northern Syria. The three cantons, which border Turkey, 
are dominated by the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD). The party is linked to the 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a former client of the Syrian regime and considered a 
“terrorist” group by the United States, the European Union, and Turkey. At the risk of 
deepening an Arab Sunni backlash that has fanned radicalization, Washington is set 
ever more on the prospect of the PYD retaking mostly Arab territory captured by the 
Islamic State. In line with German reluctance to arm warring sides, Berlin has refrained 
from giving military aid to the PYD, which is accused of carrying out war crimes. Still, 
an international effort to rebuild the cantons tied to breaking the PYD’s monopoly on 
them could help stabilize the area – even more so if Turkey could be brought on board. 
 
The Kurds have scored some of the biggest 
territorial gains in Syria since the outbreak 
of revolt against Assad family rule in 2011. 
Cooperation with the Assad regime and 
backing from the United States against the 
so-called Islamic State have strengthened 
Kurdish militias affiliated with the PYD. 
Advancing into a multi-faceted ethnic and 
tribal landscape, the so-called People’s Pro-
tection Units (YPG) captured Kurdish-major-
ity regions near Turkey and Iraq but also 
areas with a significant Arab population. 
In defiance of Turkey, the PYD set up three 
self-ruled cantons in 2014 comprising 
around one-fifth of Syria under the um-
brella name of “Rojava Self-Ruled Demo-
cratic Administration, Syria” (in Kurdish, 
Rojava means “Western Kurdistan”). The 
PYD is not calling for outright secession. Its 
declaration of self-rule and accompanying 
“social contract” mix Marxist jargon and a 
vague form of popular democracy. The docu-
ments also emphasize rights for women 
and minorities. Underneath the rhetoric, 
power rests with the PYD/YPG and their 
parent organization, the Kurdistan Workers’ 
Party, whose military command is based in 
the Kandil Mountains of Iraq. Senior politi-
cal figures linked to the PKK are also based 
in Turkey. 
In Syria, Kurds constitute around 10 per-
cent of the population, compared with 15 
percent in Iraq. Apart from Syria’s north, a 
large Kurdish concentration also exists in 
Damascus, but many have left – mainly to 
Turkey and Iraq – because of a worsening 
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economy since the revolt. Not many headed 
to the cantons. Bombings and incursions by 
jihadists into Kurdish areas, as well as forced 
recruitment into the YPG, which drove thou-
sands of youth to flee the cantons, have 
limited the region’s appeal. 
Kurdish politics in Syria 
The fall of the Ottoman Empire and its 
division by Western powers (1916–1920) 
deepened ethnic and religious conflicts 
across the Middle East. Turkish repression 
drove waves of mainly Christian and Kurd-
ish refugees into Syria during and after the 
First World War (1914–1918). The refugees 
crossed mostly into Hasakah province, an 
ethnically-mixed area in Syria where the 
Khabour River, a tributary of the Euphrates, 
provided water for agriculture. Oil was later 
discovered, raising the economic signifi-
cance of the region, which also borders 
Iraq. Bowing to a rising current of Arab 
chauvinism, in 1962 the Syrian government 
conducted a census that denied citizenship 
to 120,000 Kurds living in Hasakah and 
kept them and their descendents outside 
mainstream society. 
Ending their disenfranchisement became 
a main demand for Kurdish political par-
ties, the first of which, the Kurdish Demo-
cratic Party in Syria (KDPS), was set up in 
the 1950s. Known as “Al-Party,” the KDPS 
was an affiliate of the Kurdish Democratic 
Party (KDP) of northern Iraq. The KDP was 
founded by Mustafa Barzani in 1946, and 
later headed by his son Masoud. The Al-Par-
ty spawned numerous Kurdish parties in 
Syria that mostly deferred to the Barzani 
clan or to Jalal Talabani, who became Iraq’s 
first president after the US-led invasion that 
toppled Saddam Hussein in 2003. Talabani 
founded his Patriotic Union of Iraq (PUK) 
party in the 1970s in Damascus and 
had good ties with Bashar’s father, Hafez 
al-Assad, which helped keep the Kurdish 
political movement in Syria largely docile. 
Talabani’s influence over Kurdish politics 
lessened in the last decade because of his 
ill health and defections from the PUK. 
Barzani has thus been left as the main 
outside player dominating Syria’s Kurdish 
players, along with the PKK. 
Divide and rule 
During Hafez al-Assad’s rule (1970–2000), 
the authorities moved thousands of Arab 
tribespeople from Raqqa governorate into 
a Kurdish-populated area north of Hasakah 
city, the provincial capital. The tribesmen 
came from areas slotted to be submerged 
in plans for a hydro-electric dam on the 
Euphrates River. Known as the al-Ghamar 
Arabs (the Arabs of the flood), they became 
among the staunchest supporters of Assad 
family rule. The population transfer, which 
occurred in the 1970s, was typical of the 
divide-and-rule tactics that have been key to 
keeping Syria in the Assad family’s grip. 
A new wave of Kurdish refugees crossed 
into Syria to escape Turkish bombardment 
and the razing of their villages after the 
PKK had launched guerilla warfare against 
Turkey in 1984. Within the Kurdish com-
munity in Turkey, the PKK dealt brutally 
with dissent, for example killing teachers 
who taught Turkish-language curricula. 
In Syria, the regime allowed the refugees 
in but extracted a price. Mohammad Man-
soura, a security lieutenant of Assad, is 
thought to have made fortunes in the 1980s 
and 1990s by running protection rackets 
and taking bribes from Kurdish refugees for 
letting them in. Demographically, the new 
influx altered the composition of Syria’s 
northeast and contributed to thousands of 
Christian families in Hasakah, who were 
better off on average, migrating to the inte-
rior of Syria or abroad. Many were driven 
away by what they regarded as pro-Kurdish 
bias by the regime, which resulted in Kurd-
ish seizure of their land and unfair com-
petition for resources. 
Turkey, Syria, and the Kurds 
Assad, the father, whose government was 
embroiled in water and territorial disputes 
with Ankara, supported the PKK in its war 
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in Turkey. Similar to Hafez al-Assad’s Baath 
Party, the PKK revolved around the person-
ality cult of its founder, Abdullah Öcalan, 
and dissent was met with violence. In the 
1980s and 1990s, Öcalan lived in Syria and 
used Syria and areas in Lebanon’s Bekaa 
Valley under Syrian control as military and 
propaganda bases. 
Content that the PKK had fallen under 
the orbit of the Syrian regime, Hafez al-Assad 
did little to improve the mass lot of Syria’s 
Kurdish population. The elder Assad upheld 
the 1962 census and pursued an “Arabiza-
tion” policy that deepened bans on Kurdish 
language and culture, including celebrat-
ing the Nowruz festival. 
Political wind turns against PKK 
Under the threat of a Turkish invasion in 
1998, Hafez al-Assad expelled Öcalan and 
submitted to Turkish demands dictated to 
Syrian officials at a meeting in the Turkish 
city of Adana to stop supporting the PKK. 
The Adana agreement also forced the Syrian 
government to designate the PKK as a ter-
rorist organization – the same official desig-
nation of the PKK in Turkey, Europe, and 
the United States. The PKK tried to deflect 
pressure in the following years by establish-
ing sister organizations in Iran, Turkey, and 
Syria (the PYD). By then, Bashar al-Assad 
had inherited power. The younger Assad 
tolerated the PYD when it was set up in 
2003, although Syrian authorities had 
started handing over former PKK guerrillas 
to Turkey as part of newly-found security 
cooperation with Ankara. 
Meanwhile, the Kurds’ lot worsened 
from a water crisis. State corruption con-
tributed to the destruction of the water 
table from illegal wells in Hasakah and 
eastern Syria. Migration of Arabs and Kurds 
rose after 2004 into what became shanty 
towns around Damascus and Aleppo. 
With Syrian-Turkish ties peaking be-
tween 2007 and 2010, a closed security 
court in Damascus sentenced dozens of 
PKK guerillas to long prison sentences on 
terrorism charges. The PYD head, Saleh 
Muslim, was arrested briefly in 2010 and 
then left Syria for Kandil. But the Assad 
regime kept lines of communications open 
with the PYD, which Turkey did not mind, 
as Recep Tayyip Erdoğan sought to improve 
ties with his own country’s Kurds. 
One unintended consequence of the im-
provement in Syrian-Turkish relations was 
related to Turkey scrapping visa require-
ments for Syrian nationals. Kurds in Syria 
were able to travel and see their relatives 
in Turkey, often for the first time, which 
helped rekindle ties between Kurds in the 
two countries. It also became easier for the 
people in northern Syria to buy Turkish 
mobile phone lines and escape the eaves-
dropping of the Assad secret police. Un-
monitored cell phones became instrumen-
tal in organizing protests. 
Kurdish uprising and aftermath 
A crackdown on the Kurdish movement 
across the board followed a grassroots Kurd-
ish uprising in 2004, which was crushed 
after Assad’s forces killed 30 civilians. Provo-
cation by Assad loyalists of Kurdish spec-
tators at a football match in Qamishli 
apparently triggered the riots. It brought 
to the surface Kurdish frustration about dis-
enfranchisement, poverty, and the regime’s 
readiness to sacrifice the Kurds for better 
relations with Turkey. But the PYD and tra-
ditional Kurdish parties coordinated with 
the Assad regime to calm the Kurdish street 
in return for promises to resolve the issue 
of disenfranchisement arising from the 
1962 census. 
Assad kept ignoring the issue till 2011. 
But the iron fist of the regime did not stem 
the rise of a new generation of activists 
frustrated at the failure of the PYD and of 
the Syrian Kurdish establishment to capi-
talize on the uprising. Among them was 
Masoud Akko, a journalist who was instru-
mental in documenting the repression of 
the Kurds during the uprising and after-
ward. Akko and other young activists ad-
mired Mashaal Tammo, a Kurdish leader 
who established the Kurdish Future Move-
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ment in Syria in 2005 as an alternative to 
the traditional parties. Tammo cooperated 
with Arab dissidents and was a more open 
Kurd in this regard. He also appealed to 
young people and paid little heed to power 
centers in Iraqi Kurdistan. Among more 
religious Kurds, Mohammed Ma’shouq 
al-Khaznawi, an independent Soufi imam, 
built up a following through sermons criti-
cal of the authorities. But Khaznawi was 
assassinated in the city of Qamishli in 2005. 
Riad Drar, a moderate Syrian Arab sheikh 
and a respected scholar, was arrested for 
eulogizing Khaznawi at the funeral and 
showing solidarity with the Kurdish cause. 
Drar then spent five years in jail. 
The regime also sentenced Tammo in 
2009 to three and a half years in jail for 
“weakening national sentiment.” The audi-
ence in a Damascus courtroom shouted 
“Tammo, Tammo” once the verdict was 
read. This was unheard of in Syria, where 
the only public chants were to exalt Assad 
or his father in choreographed rallies. 
The Kurds and the Syrian revolt 
Weeks after the outbreak of the Syrian 
revolt in 2011, the Assad regime moved to 
strengthen its former PKK clients. The sup-
port for the PYD rekindled Turkish fears 
of a Kurdish state, although it primarily 
appeared to be meant to undermine the 
nonviolent core of the revolt and build up 
militia that could be allied to Assad from 
the country’s minorities. By the middle of 
2011, dozens of former PKK operatives had 
been released from prison. The Assad regime 
also set free senior jihadists, many of whom 
had returned from Iraq and were then 
jailed (for details, see Oweis, SWP Comments 
39/2015). Despite misgivings about their 
jihadist ideology, many in the opposition 
came to regard the jihadists as the bulwark 
against perceived Kurdish expansionism 
at the expense of Arab Sunnis battered by 
Assad’s carpet bombardment. 
In the first year of the revolt, paper 
reforms – combined with a deepening 
crackdown on the pro-democracy protests – 
failed to pacify Syria’s Arab Sunnis. The 
Kurds received a different treatment. Assad 
restored most Kurdish rights lost as a result 
of the 1962 census. The regime also helped 
arm the PYD by leaving the group weapons 
in the northeast. On the broader ethnic 
map, the PYD joined a de facto alliance of 
armed minority groups that has been cru-
cial to strengthening Assad’s position in the 
civil war. The alliance – comprised of Kurd-
ish, Alawite, Shi’ite, and Christian militias 
– also helped Assad repulse rebels in the 
center of Syria and the Mediterranean coast, 
as well as maintain control over pockets in 
outlying regions bordering areas in what 
became the Kurdish cantons. 
Placating the Kurds started in April 2011 
with rescinding the 1962 census. As a result, 
thousands of Kurdish former “non-persons” 
received official papers. The restoration fos-
tered a line advocated by the PYD and most 
traditional Kurdish parties to keep the 
demands of the protests in Kurdish areas 
modest while pursuing concessions for 
Kurds. This pitted the PYD and traditional 
parties against Tammo, who saw Kurdish 
demands as being inseparable from the 
demands for regime change of the wider 
protest movement. 
Tammo was released from jail in June 
2011, shortly before his sentence expired. 
Weeks later he joined Arab opposition fig-
ures in preparing a meeting in the Qaboun 
district of Damascus to plan a political 
transition. The organizers included veteran 
dissident Walid al-Bunni, a physician and 
former political prisoner from the town of 
Tel, near Damascus, and economist Aref 
Dalila, another former political prisoner 
from Assad’s Alawite sect. But the dissi-
dents were forced to cancel the conference 
two days before it was due to convene when 
Assad’s forces killed 14 demonstrators in 
Qaboun. Despite warnings by the PYD to 
stop aligning with the goals of the wider 
revolt, Tammo kept up his calls for the 
Kurds not to isolate themselves and joined 
the Syrian National Council (SNC), the 
largest grouping of the then peaceful oppo-
sition. But Tammo, who advocated non-
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violence, was no match for the PYD as secu-
rity branches began letting in hundreds of 
PKK militia based in Kandil into Hasakah 
beginning in April 2011. Saleh Muslim also 
returned from Kandil the same month and 
became the public face of the group. On the 
military side, power remained with PKK 
commanders from Kandil, while the rank-
and-file included many poor Kurds recruited 
over decades from northern Syria, trained 
in northern Iraq, and sent to serve in the 
YPG after the beginning of the revolt. 
PYD critics silenced 
The PKK militia’s new local recruits, in-
cluding women, helped the PYD act as 
enforcers for Assad. Gunmen suspected of 
links to the PYD began assaulting protest 
leaders, but Tammo was unperturbed, pre-
dicting in October 2011 that the Assad 
regime would soon use its allies to assas-
sinate non-violent activists. Days later, 
Tammo was killed when gunmen stormed 
a house he was at in Qamishli. An aide, 
Zahida Rashkilo, survived and was smuggled 
for treatment in Germany. Other figures 
in the Future Movement also fled PYD per-
secution to Germany. 
Following Tammo’s assassination, a string 
of activists who publicly opposed the PYD 
were beaten, killed, or disappeared, with 
the PYD always denying responsibility. For 
example, Radeef Mustafa, a prominent 
human rights lawyer and an ally of Tammo, 
was forced to flee his hometown of Kobanê 
to Turkey after receiving PYD threats in 
2011. His son was subsequently beaten in 
the town. In January 2012, three brothers 
of the Badro family – a prominent clan that 
had fallen afoul of the PYD – were killed 
in Qamishli after their father repulsed an 
apparent YPG incursion into their home 
and killed a YPG gunman. Also, dozens of 
activists were killed or disappeared in PYD-
controlled territory in Hasakah and Afrin 
between 2012 and 2015, such as Ahmad 
Farman Bunjuq, who was killed in a drive-
by shooting in Qamishli, and Bahzed 
Dorsen, the KDPS head in Malikiya. 
Kidnappings and deaths in detention by 
the PYD have also been documented. In one 
case in early 2015, Suhail al-Nisr, a German-
educated Syrian-Arab surgeon from Aleppo, 
was kidnapped in Afrin, despite the fact that 
he treats Kurdish patients in the region. 
Nisr was released after paying a US$50,000 
ransom. He said he had spent his two-week 
captivity among YPG militiamen in a house 
adorned with PYD insignia. In total, the 
YPG are suspected of killing at least 30 
Kurds opposed to the PYD since 2011. 
Arab-Kurdish tensions 
Tammo’s assassination in October 2011 
dealt a fatal blow to the “third way” of 
Kurdish politics in Syria, throwing the 
Future Movement into disarray and deepen-
ing splits between the Kurds and the SNC. 
The acrimony continued when the National 
Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Oppo-
sition Forces (the Coalition) was set up in 
Qatar in November 2012 as a replacement 
of the SNC. The Coalition has seen heated 
debates on the Kurdish issue. Kurdish mem-
bers, who number 17 out of 117, have been 
frustrated. They point to what they regard 
as the Coalition’s failure to shed the legacy 
of Arab nationalism and cultivate non-
Arabs wary of Assad but fearful of a jihadist 
alternative. 
The Kurdish-Arab divide widened after 
the Islamic State killed at least 220 civilians 
in an incursion into Kobanê in June 2015. 
International and Syrian human rights 
organizations have documented what they 
said were war crimes and ethnic cleansing 
of Arabs by the YPG after it captured areas 
in the cantons. At the same time, YPG mili-
tia had refused to let an investigation team 
from the Coalition cross into the Kobanê 
canton to see villages and neighborhoods 
from which the Arab population had fled 
following the PYD’s capture of the border 
town of Tel al-Abyad. The ethnic tension 
threatens to derail truces between Kurdish 
and rebel neighborhoods in Aleppo, and 
between the town of Atmeh on the border 
with Turkey and the town of Jindairis in 
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the Afrin district, where the YPG has been 
building fortifications and sniper towers. 
PYD consolidates power 
Days after Tammo was killed, Barzani super-
vised in the Iraqi city of Erbil the creation 
of the Kurdish National Council in Syria 
(KNC), a grouping of 11 traditional parties 
that joined the opposition Coalition in 
2013. On paper, the KNC formed with the 
PYD a body called the Kurdish Supreme 
Council. But the Supreme Council did not 
become an effective coordination body, 
and Kurdish politics remained broadly split 
between the PKK and its PYD offshoot on 
one side, and Barzani and his protégés in 
the KNC on the other. On the military side, 
the Barzani camp has trained hundreds of 
Syrian Kurds, raising the specter of inter-
Kurdish divisions turning into an armed 
conflagration. But the jihadist threat against 
Kurds in Syria and Iraq has helped keep a 
semblance of Kurdish unity. Still, in 2012, 
eight Kurdish officers who had earlier 
defected from Assad’s army disappeared in 
the PYD-controlled town of Malikiya near 
the Tigris River, which constitutes the 
border between Syria and Iraq. The officers 
were traveling to Iraqi Kurdistan to meet 
KDP officials. Their families accused the 
YPG of kidnapping them. A few months 
before, the officers had formed a grouping 
called the Kurdish Military Council as a 
counterweight to the YPG, and sought to 
cooperate with Free Syrian Army (FSA) bri-
gades in Aleppo. 
The PYD on the other hand had joined 
the National Coordination Body for Demo-
cratic Change (NCB), a grouping allowed 
by the authorities to operate in Damascus. 
Considered “patriotic opposition” by the 
Assad regime, the NCB does not call for the 
removal of Assad. In a measure of the PYD’s 
flexibility, Saleh Muslim signed the found-
ing charter of the NCB, which calls for a 
democratic solution to the Kurdish ques-
tion in a way that does not contradict what 
the charter terms as the “inseparability of 
Syria from the Arab World” – an anathema 
to most Kurds. On the ground, the PYD has 
pursued self-rule, helping set the stage for 
armed conflict with Arab tribes south of 
Hasakah, as opposed to the al-Ghamar Arabs 
and other tribes north of Hasakah who 
stayed with the regime and became allied 
with the PYD. 
Turkish opposition to cantons 
As a result of a de facto territorial handover 
by the Assad regime, the PYD declared self-
rule in the cantons in January 2014. Of the 
three cantons, the so-called Jazeera canton 
in the northeastern governorate of Hasakah 
is the largest, containing Syria’s wheat res-
ervoir and some of the country’s biggest oil 
fields (Syria’s total oil production before the 
revolt was 300,000–370,000 barrels per day). 
In the northwest, the Afrin canton near 
Aleppo is among Syria’s most fertile regions, 
whereas the Kobanê canton is situated 
between the other two. In an apparent deal 
with the PYD, Assad’s security operatives 
have remained in Hasakah, accessing a 
large secret police compound in the center 
of the city through YPG roadblocks. About 
30 intelligence operatives also remained in 
Kobanê, until an attack on the town by the 
Islamic State in 2014 forced them to flee. In 
Aleppo governorate, Afrin has served as a 
supply conduit to a pro-Assad Shi’ite militia 
base in the nearby towns of Nubbul and 
Zahra. US intervention eventually allowed 
the PYD to join the two cantons of Hasakah 
and Kobanê. The intervention started with 
support for the Kurdish Peshmerga forces 
as well as the bombings by the United States 
of Islamic State targets in Iraq in June 2014 
as the Islamic State declared a Caliphate in 
Iraq and Syria. Air raids were extended to 
jihadist targets in Syria in September 2014. 
The YPG’s gains were curtailed in July 
2015 when Ankara abandoned the peace 
process with the PKK and launched an 
offensive against the PKK in Turkey and 
northern Iraq following the killing of four 
Turkish police (for details, see Seufert, SWP 
Comments 38/2015). By hitting the PKK, Tur-
key sent a strong signal to the PYD to stop 
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expanding west of Kobanê. Taking heed 
of the Turkish strikes, the PYD apparently 
abandoned a drive to cross the Euphrates 
and link the Kobanê canton to Afrin. The 
expansion would have involved capturing 
a strip 95–105 km wide that separates Afrin 
and Kobanê. The strip, which is inhabited 
mainly by Arab and Turkmen, has been 
divided between Islamist-leaning FSA bri-
gades allied with Turkey on the one side 
and the Islamic State on the other. 
In the course of 2015, Ankara talked 
with the United States about turning this 
strip into a safe zone and a potential base 
for a provisional Syrian government. The 
Syrian Interim Government currently oper-
ates from the Turkish city of Gaziantep and 
counts Germany among its biggest sup-
porters. With the zone, Ankara aimed to 
contain the PYD and keep the Afrin canton 
partially isolated and dependent on Turkey. 
But the safe-zone proposal quickly fizzled 
out, with Washington and Turkey failing to 
reconcile their priorities in Syria. The Rus-
sian air campaign, which started in Septem-
ber 2015, has practically finished off the 
safe-zone idea. 
Token democracy 
In the cantons, the PYD has advertised its 
version of local government as a model. 
It has mandated equal representation for 
women in municipal councils and legis-
lative bodies, yet with little real political 
power. At the same time, the PYD has main-
tained its cult-like ideology, which appears 
to leave little room for any serious oppo-
sition. In September 2015, a branch of the 
Yekiti (unity) Party, led by dissident Habib 
Ibrahim, broke ranks with the PYD’s politi-
cal opponents and fielded candidates for 
municipal elections in the Afrin canton. 
Pro-PYD candidates ended up being awarded 
all the seats. On the military side, the YPG 
promoted women to more influential roles 
as commanders, in line with a PKK tradi-
tion that has helped the group project a 
“progressive” image and garner support, 
particularly among European leftists. 
Also, representatives of minorities such 
as Sunni Arab and Christian figures have 
been installed in the cantons’ administra-
tion, as well as staunchly pro-Assad tribal 
figures such as Humeidi Daham al-Jarba 
from Hasakah. But tensions between Kurds 
and Christians in Hasakah persist. In Sep-
tember 2015, a self-declared legislative 
council in Hasakah decreed a law putting 
the property of absentee owners under the 
jurisdiction of the administration of the 
canton in Hasakah, despite the objections 
of Christian members of the council. The 
action, which had the declared aim of pro-
tecting the properties, raised fears of an-
other Kurdish grab of Christian property in 
northeastern Syria. 
Conclusions and recommendations 
US support in the context of the fight 
against the Islamic State has enabled the 
PYD to thumb its nose at Turkey and pursue 
territorial claims, as well as maintain its 
alliance with Assad. Washington is now 
also counting on the PYD to retake the pro-
vincial capital of Raqqa, a majority Arab 
city on the Euphrates that fell to the Islam-
ic State in early 2014. But the PYD’s expan-
sion seems to have fueled Arab tribal sup-
port for jihadists. It has also complicated 
chances of finding a solution to the civil 
war, in which the main victims have been 
Arab Sunnis bombarded by Assad’s forces. 
Germany has responded to PYD requests 
for help by initiating plans for the de-min-
ing and rebuilding of Kobanê while main-
taining a policy of non-lethal aid. Yet, such 
support would involve significant supplies 
and logistics and therefore need the cooper-
ation of Turkey. With an eye on its restive 
Kurdish population, Ankara has been nerv-
ous about an expansion of the PYD-run can-
tons in Syria. The Turkish government has 
also shown little interest in defusing ten-
sions with the PKK ahead of general elec-
tions in November 2015 after Erdoğan’s 
supporters failed to secure a majority in ear-
lier polls. The Kurdish issue, among other 
geopolitical calculations, has prompted 
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Turkish support for jihadist and other rebel 
brigades in Syria. The support has been part-
ly meant to prevent the PYD from capturing 
the proposed safe-zone area and thus link 
the three cantons. 
The Turkish offensive against the PKK 
has made Ankara more confident that the 
PYD will not risk Turkish military wrath 
by expanding westwards to join the three 
cantons. Lessened Turkish fears about an 
expansionist PYD could open the way to 
bring Turkey into a reconstruction effort 
that would give Ankara a say in shaping the 
cantons and improve its relations with the 
PYD. Leaving a political door open for such 
a possibility, Ankara has distinguished 
between the PKK and the PYD, receiving 
PYD cadres and keeping more channels 
open with the PYD, partly in the hope of 
splitting the two groups. Another com-
plaint that Ankara has had about the PYD 
has been the PYD’s cooperation with Assad, 
but this has lessened since Turkey softened 
its calls in September 2015 for Assad to 
leave power. Turkey thus could be drawn 
into an international effort to stabilize the 
cantons through aid linked to progress on 
curbing brutality and lawlessness in the 
cantons, as well as a more democratic self-
rule. In this context, Germany should ask 
for safe and free access for Kurdish dissi-
dents and the wider opposition to the can-
tons. Berlin should also recommend deploy-
ing independent observers once elections 
in PYD territory comply with international 
norms, rather than being rubberstamp 
affairs. 
Turkish participation in a high-profile 
project to help the Kurds in Syria could also 
take away the sting of criticism that the 
West is ganging up on Syria’s Arab Sunnis 
and promoting the country’s minorities. 
Many in the mainstream Syrian opposition 
already regard Western pressure to agree to 
renewed UN efforts to solve the conflict as 
a ploy to keep Assad and his allies among 
Syria’s minorities in power. In the inter-
national arena, UN envoy Staffan de Mistura 
plans to convene working groups in Geneva 
starting in October 2015 to bring together 
relevant Syrian forces. The talks could be 
also a way to cajole the PYD into working 
with the rest of the Kurdish body politic, 
for example by achieving a unified Kurdish 
vision for the north and a transitional 
administration in Damascus. 
Despite PYD appeals aimed at drumming 
up German support, it would be a mistake 
for Berlin to toe the US line and support the 
PYD/YPG in the fight against the Islamic 
State beyond the Kurdish areas. The PYD 
has not only silenced other Kurdish voices, 
it has also been accused of ethnic cleansing 
in villages and towns inhabited mainly by 
Arabs, and it maintains cooperation with 
the Assad regime. Too strong a support will 
also further antagonize Turkey as well as 
rebel formations. A sustainable solution to 
end the bloodletting can come about only 
through internationally-backed compro-
mise between all groups prepared to work 
for a pluralist country. 
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